

Section 4 - Counterterrorism Intelligence and Analysis

24. Introduction - Sidney J. Caspersen

25. A Typology and Anatomy of Terrorist Operations Dennis Pluchinsky

1. The most prolific and prominent such group as of this writing calls itself the Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigades. In mid-July 2004 it issued a 15-day threat to the Italian people to get rid of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. For example, see *La Repubblica* (Rome) (8 August 2004), p .2; and Middle East Media Research Institute, *Inquiry and Analysis Series, Report No. 185* (10 August 2004).

2. Julen Agirre, *Operation Ogro: The Execution of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco* (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), p. 3.

3. Ibid.

4.

www.hostinganime.com/sout19

, 19 June 2004. This Web site publishes online jihadist military and political magazines (link not current).

5. For example, see Dennis Pluchinsky, 'An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group (1972-1991)'. In Dennis Pluchinsky and Yonah Alexander (eds.), *European Terrorism Today and Tomorrow* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1992). See also Dennis Pluchinsky and Yonah Alexander, *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*

(London: Cass, 1992).

6. CCC, 'Concrete Answers to Concrete Questions' (communique', late April 1985). Document in author's possession.

7. CCC, 'Communique' on the Bombing of the Bank of America in Antwerp on 4 December 1985'. Document in author's possession. (I have used many quotations from CCC, a fascinating left-wing terrorist group in the mid-1980s. I had personal friendships with several senior intelligence analysts in the Belgian GIA, or counterterrorism group, that was formed in 1984 as a result of CCC's terrorist campaign in Belgium. CCC's communique's provided insights—rarely afforded by any terrorist group—into its operational methods and tactical and

strategic thinking.)

8. Ibid.

9. The Irish News (Belfast) Internet version (14 February 2003).

10. FBIS EUP20041021000349, dated 21 October 2004.

11. CCC communique´ dated late April 1985—‘‘Concrete Answers to Concrete Questions.’’
12. Sean MacStiofian, *Revolutionary in Ireland* (Edinburg: Gordon-Cremonesi, 1975), p. 103.
13. Ibid.
14. Al Qaeda Terrorism Training Handbook, 180-page manual in Arabic seized in May 2000 in a global jihadist safe house in Manchester, England, translation, pp. 80–1.
15. See, for example, the author’s commentary ‘‘They Heard It All Here, and That’s the Trouble’’ in the *Washington Post* (16 June 2002): B03.
16. Manchester safe house handbook, pp. 92–8.
17. Information derived from the publication ‘‘Terrorist Tactics: Trojans, Trust Not the Horse’’ by the Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State, dated 24 September 2004.
18. Ibid.
19. *Time* (16 August 2004): 30–6; *Newsweek* (16 August 2004): 24–32.
20. The exceptions have been the August 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the September 2001 attacks in Washington, D.C., and New York City.
21. ‘‘Do Not Be with the Enemy Against Us,’’ statement issued by a Web site affiliated with al-Qaeda, Islamic Studies and Research Center (June 2003). Trans. FBIS report GMP20030611000061 (11 June 2003).
22. Statement commenting on the attack on the French oil tanker *Limburg* on 6 October 2004; issued by ‘‘Political Bureau of Al-Qaeda Organization,’’ 13 October 2002, as reported in *Al-Quds al-Arabi* (London), 16 October 2002, p. 2. Trans. FBIS report GMP20021016000051.
23. Quoted in *Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia* (Web site, www.myislah.org) (24 June 2003).
24. *Al-Battar* is a biweekly online magazine, first published January 2004. As of 17 September 2004, it was at Issue 18.
25. Statement of July 2002
26. *The Role of Intelligence in Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security* - C. Patrick Duecy

1. See Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Appendix C, 411 “An Intelligence Community Primer“.

www.wmd.gov/report/report.html#appendixc

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2. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 410. For subsequent quotations from this report, page

numbers will be noted parenthetically.

3. Executive Order 13356, Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans (27 August 2004).

27. Counterterrorism Analysis and Homeland Security - Mark Kauppi

1. This discussion is drawn from Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs, Factbook on Intelligence,

www.cia.gov/cia/publications/facttell/index.html

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2. In the language of the counterterrorism analyst, you are trying to see how the report fits into ““current streams of reporting.““

3. Bruce Hoffman, ““Terrorism Trends and Prospects.““ In Ian O. Lesser, et al. (eds.), *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1999), pp. 8, 9.

4. U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999* (April 2000), p. iii.

5. See, e.g., Paul P. Andrews and Marilyn Peterson (eds.), *Criminal Intelligence Analysis* (Loomis, Calif.: Palmer, 1990).

6. There is a story that during a hearing, a congressman asked a counterterrorism manager, ““How many terrorist incidents did your organization stop by timely intelligence?““ This is akin to asking the border patrol, ““How many undetected terrorists entered the United States last year?““ The FBI is the one agency that publicly announces the number of terrorist incidents it has prevented; see *Terrorism in the United States 1999: 30 Years of Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2001), p. 3. But because of the ““paradox of warning,““ even the FBI cannot be sure that it has not experienced more successes than it may

suppose.

7. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (20 December 1983), p. 63; Air Force Inspector General and Judge Advocates General, ‘‘Report of Investigation: The Khobar Towers Bombing,

25 June 1996: Background,’’ at

www.fas.org/irp/threat/khobar_af/tableof.htm

.; ‘‘Report of the Accountability Review Boards: Executive Overview,’’.

8. 9/11 Commission, p. 74.

9. CIA, DCI Counterterrorist Center: Preempt, Disrupt, Defeat, n.d.

10. Jason Burke, ‘‘Think Again: Al Qaeda,’’ Foreign Policy 143 (May–June 2004) (‘‘Al Qaeda’’s dead: the organization of men whose deadly choreography of planes in the sky murdered 3,000 people on September 11 has been smashed into oblivion’’). Corine Hegland, ‘‘Global Jihad: No End in Sight,’’ National Journal (8 May 2004) (‘‘A new generation of terrorists is emerging to take the place of elders who have been killed, captured, or forced deep underground’’). Paul Havenand and Chris Tomlinson, ‘‘Al-Qaeda’’s New Guard,’’ Washington Times (16 June 2004). www.washingtontimes.com/world/20040615-100822-2072r.htm

11. ‘‘The ships, planes, antennas, and satellites are the result of a triumph of Cold War engineering, designed to keep tabs on the Soviet Union and its allies. The question now is this: How useful is the system against terrorists who know not to trust their satellite phones? How effective can it be in an age when almost untappable fiber-optic lines carry information at stupefying rates and cheap, off-the-shelf encryption systems can stump the most powerful supercomputers on earth?’’ Stephen Cass, ‘‘Listening In,’’ IEEE Spectrum (April 2003): 33.